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Falling Through The Cracks:
The Unique Circumstances of HIV Disease
Under Recent Americans With Disabilities
Act Caselaw and Emerging Privacy
Policies
Caroline Palmer and Lynn Mickelson*
Introduction
Most acts of discrimination begin with a breach of
confidentiality, a betrayal of trust, or an opinion informed by
nothing more than stereotype or bias. Discrimination is usually
intentional. It is a conscious choice to undermine the perceived
other through unwanted exposure. Fictions are contrived as fact
to suit dishonorable purposes. The perpetrator is self-serving, yet
rationalizes discriminatory acts as benefits to the common good -
a flawed utilitarian approach. Inner frustration and hatred are
directed outward, yet are rarely satisfied. Discrimination is part
of an ugly cycle that infects the culture as a whole.
At times, however, discrimination may be the result of
negligence - the mislaid document, a slip of the lip.1 What
Caroline Palmer, J.D. 1998, Hamline University School of Law, Staff Attorney
at the Minnesota AIDS Project (MAP), and Lynn Mickelson, J.D. 1983, William
Mitchell College of Law, Legal Services Manager at MAP. The authors thank Bob
Tracy, MAP Director of Community Affairs, and Dan Kelly, MAP Legal Services
Assistant, for their input.
The Minnesota AIDS Project (MAP) envisions a world free of AIDS. MAP leads
Minnesota's fight to stop HIV and enhance the well-being of those affected.
Founded in 1983, MAP is a statewide, nonprofit agency committed to enhancing the
lives of people living with HIV, providing prevention education for those at risk for
HIV, and advocating for the rights of all affected by HIV. From community
outreach and legal consultation to emergency assistance, MAP is a leader in the
fight against HIV. In partnership with more than 1,400 volunteers, MAP provides
compassionate, confidential, and non-discriminatory services, including practical,
emotional, and social support. Nearly half of the approximately 4,500 Minnesotans
living with HIV use services provided by MAP. MAP Legal Services assists clients
with a variety of civil issues including confidentiality, discrimination, employment,
family, estate planning, civil liberties, and benefits access, and also provides
resources for HIV-related criminal cases. For further information visit MAP's
website at www.mnaidsproject.org.
1. See generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U.
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happens after the lapse in judgment, however, is critical.
Remedial action might not rectify the mistake entirely, but
demonstrates good faith and a willingness to learn. Further
negligence - taking advantage of the situation for personal gain
through gossip or coercion - is discrimination. One chooses to
break the cycle. It is a moral choice.
Morality and discrimination are important issues in the
context of HIV disease. 2 The epidemic is now entering its third
decade, and great strides have been made in managing its impact.3
PA. L. REV. 899, 902 (1993) (describing the phenomena of unconscious
discrimination).
2. In this Article, "HIV disease" refers to both HIV and AIDS. The Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) causes Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS). The virus is found in certain body fluids including blood, semen, vaginal
fluid, breast milk, and other fluids containing blood, such as amniotic fluid
surrounding a fetus or cerebrospinal fluid. The Kaiser Family Foundation Capital
Hill Briefing Series on HIV/AIDS, The State of the HIVIAIDS Epidemic in
America, 2, 3 (Apr. 2000), available at
http://www.kff.org/content/2000/1581/stateofepi.pdf. HIV is transmitted from one
individual to another through sexual contact and blood-to-blood contact (i.e.
sharing needles). Id.
HIV destroys a certain kind of blood cells - CD4+ T cells (helper cells) -
which are crucial to the normal function of the human immune system. In
fact, loss of these cells in people with HIV is an extremely powerful
predictor of the development of AIDS .... [Riecently developed sensitive
tests have shown a strong connection between the amount of HIV in the
blood and decline in CD4+ T cell numbers and the development of AIDS.
Reducing the amount of virus in the body with anti-HIV drugs can slow
this immune destruction.
Centers for Disease Control National Center for HIV, STD and TB Prevention,
Questions and Answers: HIV is the Cause of AIDS, at
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/cause.htm (last updated Feb. 27, 2002).
3. AIDS is no longer among the fifteen leading causes of death in the United
States. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, After 20 Years, AIDS is Woven into America's Fabric,
STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 3, 2001, at A3. In the United States, highly active
antiretroviral therapy, i.e. protease inhibitors, "helped transform HIV disease into
a chronic but manageable condition." Bob Adams, Is the Act Up?, HIV PLUS,
June/July 2002, at 14. AIDS is, however, the fourth leading cause of death
worldwide. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, HIV/AIDS POLICY FACT
SHEET: THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC 1 (July 2002), available at
http://www.kff.org/contenti2002/3030-02/Global-Factsheet.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL
FACT SHEET]. Not everyone responds favorably to new treatments and some
treatments have debilitating side effects. See The Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation, HIV/AIDS POLICY FACT SHEET: THE HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC IN THE
UNITED STATES, (July 2002), available at http://www.kff.org/content2002/3029-
02/US_FactSheet.pdf [hereinafter U.S. FACT SHEET]. Side effects include, but are
not limited to, diarrhea, nausea, changes in body composition and fat distribution
(lipoatrophy and lipodeposition), anemia, muscle weakness, fatigue, neuropathy,
headaches, and pancreatis. Webcast moderated by Anquoinette Crosby with
participants Richard Elion, M.D. (George Washington University School of
Medicine) and Brian A. Boyle, M.D. (New York Presbyterian Hospital-Cornell
University Medical Center), HIV Treatment Side Effects, at
http://www.managinghiv.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Webcast].
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Stigma, prejudice, and fear still persist because HIV disease
involves complicated social and politically-charged issues,
specifically drugs, class, race, politics, religion, disability, poverty,
sex, and sexual orientation. 4 77 percent of all Americans believe
people with HIV disease are treated unfairly.5 This belief is
evidenced by the everyday reality of discrimination occurring in
venues ranging from the workplace to schools, treatment centers,
nursing homes, medical clinics, housing, airlines, and government
service providers. 6  It takes the form of words or actions.
Sometimes threats and actual violence occur. 7
In instances of racial or gender discrimination, the target
traits are generally visible. Individuals with HIV disease are not
readily identifiable.8 While some refuse to keep their health a
secret, no matter the consequence, others carefully select
confidantes, in hopes of avoiding negative repercussions that can
accompany the act of disclosing HIV status.9 Shared values,
4. See David I. Schulman, AIDS Workplace Law and Policy, 9 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 543, 547 (1990). "Because of the threat they pose to life itself, epidemics
threaten the social fabric. A primal human response to such threats has been
ritual acts of purification and scapegoating." Id. See also Erika L. Greenfield,
Maintaining Employees'Priuacy of HIV and AIDS Information in the Workplace, 15
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 277, 278 (1997) (noting that "[tlhis negative reputation
is the result of American 'cultural, religious, moral, and ethical taboos' which
commonly prevent AIDS from being freely discussed"). See also Stolberg, supra
note 3, at A3 (noting the disparate impact of AIDS on the poor and minorities).
5. MINNESOTA AIDS PROJECT, KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDES ABOUT HIV IN
MINNESOTA: A SURVEY COMMISSIONED BY THE MINNESOTA AIDS PROJECT
(conducted by Mason-Dixon Polling & Research, Inc. of Washington D.C. Feb. 5 &
6, 2001), at cover.
6. See generally Montalvo v. Radcliffe, 167 F.3d 873, 874-79 (4th Cir. 1999)
(discussing discrimination in schools); Doe v. New York City, 825 F. Supp. 36, 37-38
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing discrimination on airlines); W.G.A. v. Priority
Pharmacy, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 616, 616-17 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (discussing discrimination
in the workplace, schools, social settings, and public accommodations); Howe v.
Hull, 873 F.Supp. 72, 78 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (discussing discrimination in hospitals);
Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n of Town of
Fairfield, 790 F.Supp. 1197, 1201-22 (D. Conn. 1992) (discussing discrimination in
zoning); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F.Supp. 376, 378-91 (D.N.J. 1990)
(discussing discrimination by government service providers namely law
enforcement); Marcus Garvey Nursing Home, Inc. v. New York State Div. of
Human Rights, 209 A.D.2d 619, 619-20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (discussing
discrimination in nursing homes).
7. See Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 331 (3rd Cir. 2000).
8. See Know HIVIAIDS, Get the Facts at
www.knowhivaids.org/prev-getfacts.html (last visited March 25, 2003); iVillage,
Visible Signs of HIV Infection?, at
www.Ivillagehealth.com/experts/infectious/qas/O,,417599_173978,0O.html (last
visited March 25, 2003).
9. See The Cost of Stigma, AIDSLINE BRIEF (Minnesota AIDS Project), Mar. 2001,
at 5 [hereinafter The Cost of Stigma].
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personal beliefs, and trust play key roles in this decision-making
process. Unfortunately trust is sometimes abused. When "outed"
through intentional or negligent disclosures, people with HIV
disease must face consequences involving family, friends, career,
faith, and community. 10 Fear of disclosure and recrimination can
lead to isolation, anxiety, depression, high-risk behavior, even a
refusal to seek necessary medical treatment." Moral judgments,
whether self-imposed or constructed by society, are powerful
determinants in individual actions.
The law is continually evolving in its response to the moral
challenges presented by HIV disease.' 2 However, law cannot take
the place of morality.' 3 It provides only principles- the individual
must make distinctions based on instilled beliefs.' 4 Nonetheless,
the law is the arbiter when personal moralities clash, and HIV
10. See Schulman, supra note 3, at 551.
The law strictly regulates disclosure of such information because of the
powerful potential for social stigma of wrongful disclosures. Such
disclosures can result in violations of constitutional rights, statutory
confidentiality protections, discrimination, invasion of privacy, and actions
alleging intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Significant consequential damage can result from wrongful disclosures
because of the special capacity of HIV information to lead to wrongful
terminations, loss of insurance, evictions, and even the loss of friends and
family.
Id.
11. See generally The Cost of Stigma, supra note 9, at 5 (noting the fears of
disclosing HIV status).
12. See Caroline Palmer & Lynn Mickelson, Many Rivers to Cross: Evolving and
Energing Legal Issues in the Third Decade of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 28 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 455 (2001).
13. See Frank J. Cavico, Invasion of Privacy in the Private Employment Sector:
Tortious and Ethical Aspects, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1263, 1332-33 (1993).
Equating legality with morality, however, is a flawed ethical approach.
One's moral duty may demand conduct above and beyond what the law
requires. One's moral beliefs may also require condemnation and
disobedience of an "unjust" law. There is no guarantee, moreover, that the
moral views of society are accurately reflected in its law. Not everything
immoral can be made illegal.
Id.
14. Id. at 1333.
The law influences and shapes moral standards. In return, it reflects the
moral beliefs of a society, thereby providing criteria for right or wrong
conduct. Moral standards and their ethical framework, therefore, are
important in decision-making as an analytic system from legal standards.
Why do people then retreat to the positive expression of the law as a norm
for morality and ignore the underlying moral issues?
Id. See also Schulman, supra note 3. "(Llaw now has evolved requirements for
treating others fairly, even during such times of social turmoil - particularly during
such times. As we struggle today, law can guide us past our primal impulses to
blame and victimize, and contribute to alleviating the stress and pain of the
epidemic." Id. at 560.
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disease inhabits a realm where conflict is constant.15
This Article limits its scope to two especially contentious
legal concerns and their relationship to HIV disease: disability
determinations under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) 16 and privacy law on both the state and federal levels.
Section I is a brief report on the state of HIV disease
internationally, nationally, and in Minnesota. 17  Section II
explores two ADA decisions released by the United States
Supreme Court during the 2001-02 term and their potential
impact on the treatment of individuals with HIV disease under
disability law.18 Section III reviews emerging privacy policies and
their current and potential impact on HIV disease, particularly in
the context of workplace disclosure. 19 A discussion of a medical
records privacy bill, first proposed during the 2002 Minnesota
State Legislature session and reintroduced during the 2003
session, advocates the passage of a new law in Minnesota to deter
confidentiality breaches. 20 Newly enacted medical information
state database collection rules will also be discussed in this
context. 2
1
This Article concludes that although the nature of HIV
disease has changed significantly in the United States, stigma
persists because of the complicated moral issues engendered by
the circumstances, stereotypes, and misinformation surrounding
the disease. Education helps, yet without a corresponding shift in
global attitude, it falls short of the hoped-for panacea. Still, the
goal of realizing a society where individuals are not judged,
threatened or ostracized on the basis of their health status is
attainable. Placing HIV disease within the greater context of
protections afforded all individuals in the United States will help
us reach that goal.
I. HIV Disease in the Twenty-First Century
In 1982, after nearly a year of tracking a series of rare
infections among members of the gay men's community, the
United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
named the health phenomenon Acquired Immune Deficiency
15. See infra notes 148-166 and accompanying text.
16. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
17. See infra notes 22-48 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 54-166 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 166-277 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 265-277 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 265-277 and accompanying text.
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Syndrome (AIDS) and identified several high-risk groups.22 In the
twenty years since the CDC released an identifier and definition
for the new disease, a fast-moving global epidemic has emerged
that affects men, women, and children of all sexual orientations,
races, ethnicities, and economic classes, although some groups
have been affected disproportionately. 23 In 2000, the World Bank
declared HIV disease a developmental crisis.24 Shortly thereafter,
the United States and the United Nations Security Council
identified HIV disease as a world security threat.25
AIDS is now the fourth leading cause of death worldwide. 26
Recent statistics show that forty million people in the world are
currently living with HIV or AIDS, and approximately three
million die people died of AIDS in 2001.27 This year alone, five
million people will become infected, and fourteen million children
will lose one or both parents to AIDS. 28 Since 1982, over twenty
million lives have been claimed by HIV disease. 29 As home to 71
percent (28.5 million) of the world's infected persons, sub-Saharan
Africa has experienced the most devastation to its population.3 0
The predominant route of transmission is through heterosexual
sex, but men who have sex with men, injecting drug users, and sex
industry workers are also among the primary affected groups. 31
After Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia are
22. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, The AIDS Epidemic at 20 Years:
Selected Milestones (June 2001) 4, available at
http://www.kff.org/content/2001/3026/aids20-timeline.pdf [hereinafter Milestones];,
Laurie Garrett, AIDS at 20: Legacy of Hope and Despair, NEWSDAY, May 29, 2001,
at A4. The high-risk behaviors at the time included sexual activity between men
and intravenous drug use. Milestones, supra. High risk traits included Hemophilia
A and Haitian origin. Id. In 1983, the CDC added female partners of men with
HIV/AIDS to the list. Id.
23. See Palmer & Mickelson, supra note 12, at 456-69 (discussing the epidemic
history and disproportionate impact on communities of color and poor
communities). HIV disease has been described as occurring in two "worlds," 'a rich
world' where 500,000 people with HIV have access to ARVs (anti-retrovirals) and
25,000 die of AIDS each year, and a 'poor world,' where in sub-Sarahan Africa
alone, 30,000 people out of 30 million with HIV receive treatment, and where 2.2
million died of AIDS last year." Joe Larson, International AIDS Conference
Highlights, THE ALIVELINE, Aug. 2002, at 1.
24. See GLOBAL FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 1.
25. See Milestones, supra note 22.
26. See GLOBAL FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 1.
27. See UNAIDS, REPORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC 8,
UNAIDS/02.26E (2002).
28. Id.
29. See GLOBAL FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 1.
30. See id. South Africa, with approximately five million infected persons, has
the world's highest population of persons living with HIV disease. Id.
31. Id.
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the fastest growing regions for HIV disease due largely to
intravenous drug use. 32
The failure of the world's wealthiest economies to contribute
proportional amounts to the overall relief effort is a contributing
factor to the global AIDS epidemic. 33  Access to treatment,
education, and prevention efforts have made a significant
difference in mortality rates in the United States. 34 Few in the
HIV community, however, would agree that the United States
sufficiently funds the battle against HIV disease on either the
foreign or domestic fronts.3 5
It is estimated that up to 950,000 Americans are living with
HIV disease, including more than 300,000 diagnosed with AIDS.36
Forty thousand new infections occur each year. 37  Sexual
transmission and intravenous drug use are the main modes of
transmission, and men having sex with men account for the
32. Id.
33. See GLOBAL AIDS ALLIANCE, FILLING THE FUNDING GAP TO SAVE LivEs 3, 6
(Oct. 9, 2002), available at
http://globalaidsalliance.org/Filling-the-Funding-Gap-09Oct2.pdf. UNAIDS has
estimated that at least seven to ten billion dollars is needed on an annual basis to
effectively respond to the epidemic. Id. The Global AIDS Alliance (GAA), a
nonprofit dedicated to stopping AIDS worldwide, recently announced that its
Global Fund needs 4.25 billion dollars in 2003 but only 650 million dollars has been
pledged. Id. The United States, according to GAA, should provide a "fair-share
contribution" of 1.488 billion dollars, which is "about [seven] times what President
Bush has pledged to provide." Id. See also Gay Men's Health Crisis Press Release,
GMHC Exposes Bush AIDS Funding Shell Game (Feb. 5, 2003), at
http://www.gmhc.org/aboutus/pressO30205.html. Although President Bush
announced a fifteen billion dollar aid package for global HIV prevention, only two
billion dollars will be allocated in fiscal year 2004. Id. Further, the administration
only targeted one billion dollars to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria over a five-year period (200 million dollars per year). Id.
34. See U.S. FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 1.
35. See Denial Here at Home, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2002, at A18. Low funding
for AIDS relief by the Bush administration may contribute to three million deaths
a year, a fact the editorial writer refers to as "murder by complacency." Id. A five
billion dollar pledge for AIDS relief, as compared to 200 billion dollars for war
against Iraq, would make a significant difference and save lives. Id. See also
David Brown, HHS Reviews Funding to AIDS Groups After Protest, WASH. POST,
Aug. 19, 2002, at Al. Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson
was heckled at the International AIDS Conference in Barcelona by protestors
stating that the United States does not do enough to address the treatment and
care of persons with HIV in poor countries. Id. In retaliation, HHS, by request of
twelve members of Congress, began investigating more than a dozen AIDS service
organizations whose members joined in the protests. ld. This action could
potentially affect funding and produce a chilling result on organizations protesting
the government's lack of commitment to AIDS relief. Id.
36. See U.S. FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 1.
37. Id.
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largest population affected. 38 The number of HIV infected women
continues to grow and it is now estimated that women account for
30 percent of all new HIV infections. 39  Racial and ethnic
minorities in all gender categories are disproportionately
represented in HIV disease statistics and now comprise the
majority of all new AIDS cases in the United States. 40 The rising
numbers of HIV disease diagnoses among young people signal a
need for more aggressive prevention programs that emphasize
total health, including sex education, and do not rely solely on
abstinence messages. 41
Many of the national trends for populations affected and
disproportional results are reflected in Minnesota's HIV disease
statistics. Over 6,660 cases of HIV disease have been recorded in
Minnesota since the beginning of the epidemic. 42 Currently, 4,331
individuals are living with HIV or AIDS in the state.43 AIDS has
claimed over 2300 lives since the beginning of the epidemic. 44 The
primary mode of transmission is sex (male to male among men,
male to female among women).45 African American and African-
38. Id. 46 percent of all reported adult/adolescent AIDS cases have been linked to
sex between men. Id. Men who have sex with men account for 42 percent of all
new infections. Id.
39. Id. at 2. Infection among women is due primarily to heterosexual sex (75
percent) followed by intravenous drug use (25 percent). Id. Wornen of color are
disproportionately affected: African American women currently account for 64
percent of new AIDS cases among women. Id. Latina women account for 17
percent of new AIDS cases among women. Id.
40. Id. African Americans and Latinos represent only 12 percent and 14 percent
of the United States population respectively. Id. However, they account for 47
percent and 19 percent of newly reported cases in 2000. Id. HIV is the leading
cause of death for African Americans between the ages of 25 to 44 and third for
Latinos in the same age group. Id. See Stohlberg, supra note 3, at A3. "AIDS in
this country is increasingly an epidemic of the poor, which means it is increasingly
an epidemic of minorities." Id.
41. See, e.g., U.S. FACT SHEET, supra note 3, at 5 (noting the rising number of
HIV/AIDS cases among young people). Abstinence-only education programs using
government money to promote religion have experienced judicial rebuke despite the
Bush Administration's attempts to increase funds to federal abstinence programs
and other faith-based initiatives. See, e.g., Ceci Connolly, Judge Orders Changes in
Abstinence Program; Louisiana Group Found to Be Promoting Religion, WASH.
POST, July 26, 2002, at A3 (noting a successful American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) challenge to the Louisiana's Governor's Program on Abstinence by
demonstrating a violation of the First Amendment's separation between church
and state requirement).
42. Minnesota Department of Health, HIV Surveillance Report, 2001, 2001,
HIV/AIDS IN MINNESOTA: ANNUAL REVIEW 7, available at
http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/dpc/aids-std/inc2OOl.pdf (last visited Feb. 18,
2003).
43. Id. at 8.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 29, 31.
[Vol. 21:219
FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS
born women are disproportionately represented, making up 66
percent of all cases among women. 46
HIV disease has changed the world in countless ways. For
example, Presidential Commissions have been established to
create recommended protocols to aid employers, schools, and
communities while they are creating policies that affect the rights
of persons with AIDS and HIV disease. 47 Non-profit AIDS service
organizations exist throughout the country that provide services to
affected populations and raise awareness through educational
efforts and fundraising activities. 48 Young people do not know a
world without AIDS. Significantly, different cultures have been
forced to confront deep-seated beliefs about sexuality, sexual
orientation, chemical dependency, delivery of medical services,
residential and hospice care, race, and many other complicated
social constructs. 49 Rigid morality simply cannot overcome the
awesome scope of this health crisis.
II. Recent Americans with Disabilities Act Cases: A New
Interpretation of Legislative Intent in the United States
Supreme Court and the Potential Implications for
Individuals with HIV Disease
A. Setting the Stage: Bragdon v. Abbott
The ADA50 prohibits discrimination based on disability in
employment (Title 1),51 public services (Title II),52 public
accommodations (Title III),53 and miscellaneous venues (Title V).54
The law created "a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities ... [by providing] clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities. 55 Congress defined disability as a "physical or mental
46. Id. at 19.
47. See Schulman, supra note 3, at 543.
48. For a listing of services (i.e. AIDS hotlines and service organizations), see
http://www.thebody.com/hotlines.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
49. See UNAIDS, MEN, CULTURE & HIV / AIDS 1, 1-2, available at
http://www.unaids.org/wac/2001/Campaigndocs/culture.pdf (last visited March 25,
2003).
50. Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12150.
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189.
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2). The ADA expanded upon the Rehabilitation Act
2003]
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impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities. 56 ADA claimants must also show that their condition is
widely perceived as disabling and that they either have a record of
being disabled, an actual disability, or are regarded as being
disabled, whether or not the conditions associated with the
disability currently exist.57 This definition has proven confusing
for the courts, particularly because Congress did not include a list
of impairments or specify what a "major life activity" might be. 58
A wide variety of judicial interpretations paved the way for
Bragdon v. Abbott 59 in 1998.60 Bragdon represents the first time
the United States Supreme Court considered HIV disease in the
of 1973, which provided protections in the context of federal government
employment, programs receiving federal aid, or government contractors. See 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1999). The ADA drafters "lifted" the disability definition from section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See William C. Smith, Drawing Boundaries, A.B.A.
J., Aug. 2002, 48, 50. Arlene Mayerson, lawyer with the Disability Rights
Education Fund in Berkeley, California, explained that the three-prong approach
would "cover all the important bases" when litigating the definition of "legal
disability":
Prong one incorporates a functional approach that 'looks to the
characteristics of the individual. The second and third prongs - "record of'
and "regarded as" - incorporate a social relations approach that looks to
the negative reactions to an impairment rather than the extent of the
impairment itself. Thus, even if workers or job applicants were not
substantially limited by their disabilities, they still should be protected
from adverse treatment in the workplace because of their real or perceived
impairments.
Id.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The Rehabilitation Act regulations issued by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1977 provide a list of "major life
activities" including: "walking, seeing, hearing" and "performing manual tasks." 45
C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(ii) (2001). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) has created a definition of "substantially limits" for ADA purposes:
"[ulnable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform" or "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner or duration under which the average person in
the general population can perform that same major life activity." 29 C.F.R. §
1630.20) (2001). The Regulations also list the following factors to determine
whether a person is substantially limited in a major activity: "[t]he nature and
severity of the impairment; [the] duration or expected duration of the impairment;
and [tihe permanent or long-term impact, or the expected permanent or long-term
impact of or resulting from the impairment." Id. at §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)-(C).
58. See Sherena Shawrieh, Bragdon v. Abbott- Expanding the Reach of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, DEF. COUNS. J., Jan. 2000, at 107. See also Denise
DeCell, Bragdon v. Abbott: A Case of HIV as a Perceived Disability Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 933, 940 (1999) (noting that
the statute "does not explicitly define impairment with regard to disability").
59. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
60. See, e.g., Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Md., 123 F.3d 156, 170 (4th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the plaintiffs "asymptomatic HIV infection" was not a disability
under the ADA).
[Vol. 21:219
FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS
context of an ADA decision. 61
The Bragdon Court interpreted the ADA disability
determination to include people with asymptomatic HIV or AIDS,
or people in the early stages of HIV disease. 62 Sidney Abbott, a
woman with asymptomatic HIV at the start of the case, went to
see her dentist, Dr. Randon Bragdon, for a filling.63 Although
Bragdon did not refuse to treat Abbott, he stated that he would
only perform the procedure in a hospital because she was HIV-
positive. 64 He offered his services at the hospital for no extra
charge, but explained Abbott would be responsible for any hospital
costs. 65 Abbott filed a discrimination suit under Title III of the
ADA, which prohibits discrimination in public accommodations. 66
Abbott argued that she had a "physical or mental impairment that
substantially" limited one or more of her "major life activities" -
reproduction. 67 The district court granted her motion for summary
judgment and the First Circuit affirmed. 68 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the questions of whether reproduction
could be considered a major life activity, whether an asymptomatic
individual with HIV disease is disabled, and whether a health care
provider must perform an invasive procedure on an infectious
patient in his office. 69
The Court used a three-step analysis to determine whether
Abbott was disabled.70 First, the Court examined Congressional
61. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 644-48. The Court discussed prior agency and judicial
interpretations which did not have the guidance of Supreme Court opinions on the
matter. Id.
62. Id. at 641. The difference between symptomatic and asymptomatic depends
on an individual's CD4 count and viral load at any given time. See NEW MEXICO
AIDS INFONET, ACUTE HIV INFECTION 1 (Aug. 5, 2002), at
http://www.thebody.com/nmai/pdfs/acuteinfection.pdf.
63. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628-29.
64. Id. at 629.
65. Id.
66. Id. Title III states, "[N]o individual shall be discriminated against on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by
any person who ... operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)
(1994). "Public accommodation" includes the "professional office of a health care
provider." 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (1994).
67. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637. The first prong of the ADA definition for disability
states: "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
68. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F.Supp. 580, 584 (D.Me. 1995), aff'd, 107 F.2d 934,
949 (lst Cir. 1997).
69. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628, 648.
70. Id. at 631.
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intent and agency interpretation of the ADA. 71  Next, using
regulations promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act and
extensive medical analysis of HIV disease, the Court concluded
that during an asymptomatic phase the virus actively attacks
white blood cells and lymph nodes.7 2  The Court therefore
concluded that asymptomatic HIV is a physical impairment within
the meaning of the ADA.7 3 The Court further decided that
reproduction was a "major life activity" because it was "central to
the life process itself."74
Finally, the Court stated that Abbott satisfied the third step
of the disability test because HIV disease limited her ability to
reproduce to two ways: in order to conceive Abbott would risk
exposing her partner to infection, and if she conceived, she would
risk passing the infection to the child during pregnancy and
birth.75 Abbott met the ADA disability test because, although she
could still conceive and give birth, the dangers associated with
these activities created a substantial limitation in her life
choices. 76 Thus, the Court held Abbott disabled under the ADA
definition. 77
The Court further held that a defendant would not be liable
for discrimination under the ADA if the plaintiffs treatment
71. Id. According to the rules of statutory construction, defined terms imply that
they correspond with regulatory interpretations already in existence. Id. at 631-33.
Established administrative and .judicial interpretations further inform meaning.
Id. at 646-47. Because Congress relied extensively on the Rehabilitation Act and
its jurisprudence to define disability, the Court concluded that the decision making
of agencies implementing a statute "constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." Id. at
642. See, e.g., Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285-86 (1987)
(holding that employees with infectious diseases were considered disabled under
the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 790 et seq.).
72. Brogdon, 524 U.S. at 637.
73. Id. The Rehabilitation Act defined "physical impairment" as "any
physiological disorder or condition ... affecting one or more of the following body
systems: ... hemic and lymphatic." Id. at 632 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (j)(2)(i)
(1997)). This definition is virtually the same as the one adopted by the ADA and
the EEOC for purposes of implementing the ADA. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631.
74. Id. at 638. Mr. Bragdon argued that Congress intended the ADA to only
apply to an individual's public or economic activities but the Court found nothing in
the statutory interpretation to support this contention. Id. The Court looked to the
Rehabilitation Act regulations, which included a list of "major life functions." Id.
The list included "caring for one's self [and] performing manual tasks." Id. at 638-
39. The Court concluded that these activities are neither public nor economic,
further bolstering its conclusion that Congress did not intend to limit the definition
in such a way. Id.
75. Id. at 639-40.
76. Id. at 641.
77. Id. at 641-42.
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"pose[d] a direct threat to the health or safety of others."78  A
direct threat under the ADA is "a significant risk to the health or
safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of
policies, practices, or procedures, or by the provisions of auxiliary
aids or services." 79 Referring again to legislative intent, the Court
explained that Congress included direct threat language in order
to deter discrimination based on irrational fear and
misinformation.8 0 This was an important distinction to make in
the context of an HIV-based disability claim because the Court
recognized that stigma plays a role in the perception and
treatment of individuals with HIV disease.8 1 The Court sent a
"much needed signal that HIV-positive Americans are
substantially limited only in the manner in which they are treated
by the uninformed and frightened."8 2
Despite the clarification of disability definitions and direct
threat analysis, the Court left several questions unanswered in
Bragdon. For example, how would the decision affect HIV-positive
people who do not plan to reproduce, or who plan to use
nontraditional methods for conception, or seniors with HIV disease
who are beyond their reproductive years?8 3  Ultimately the
Bragdon decision is very limited in scope, leaving the door open for
further disagreement on HIV disability determinations. Because
the Court narrowly tailored its analysis to an asymptomatic
woman of reproductive age and ability, leaving open some
discussion as to the impact of AIDS on other life activities yet
ultimately failing to elaborate on how the ADA might apply in
78. Id. at 648 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994)).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3).
In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or
safety of others, a public accommodation must make an individualized
assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical
knowledge or on the best available objective evidence, to ascertain: the
nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential
injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of
policies, practices or procedures will mitigate the risk.
Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.2d 934, 943 (1st Cir. 1997). Evidence is confined to the
medical evidence available at the time a service provider refuses treatment. See id.
at 944. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045 (2002), discussed infra
notes 121-147 and accompanying text, expands upon the definition of direct threat
to include the disabled person as well. Id.
80. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 649.
81. Id. The court concluded that "few, if any, activities in life, are risk free." Id.
This statement indicated that there is a critical difference between a belief,
unfounded in evidence, and a substantiated fact. Id. See also DeCell, supra note
58, at 944-50 (discussing the "direct threat exception" to the ADA).
82. DeCell, supra note 58, at 950.
83. See Adams, supra note 2, at 15; Shawrieh, supra note 58, at 111-12.
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those instances, it is likely that individuals who fail to fit such
criteria will not be able to utilize Bragdon as sole precedent.8 4 The
next section examines this assertion in more detail by reviewing
recent ADA decisions by the Court.
B. Landmark Changes in the Supreme Court's 2001-02
Term
i. Toyota Manufacturing Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams
On March 14, 2002, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor gave a
speech at the Georgetown University Law Center.8 5 She stated
that the ADA is "an example of what happens when sponsors are
so eager to get something passed that what passes hasn't been as
carefully written as a group of law professors might put together.
8 6
So it leaves lots of ambiguities and gaps and things for courts to
figure out."8 7  In the years since Bragdon, the Supreme Court
appears to be addressing conflicts within the Act. Simultaneously,
84. See Shawrieh, supra note 58, at 111. Shawrieh points out that even though
one of the most likely groups of plaintiffs is gay males,
[bly definition they cannot conceive through sexual activity with their
partners. The plaintiff in the pre-Bragdon Fourth Circuit, Runnebaum v.
Nationsbank of Maryland, would most likely lose now as he lost originally.
Runnebaum was an asymptomatic HIV-positive male bank employee who
was fired after two shipments of AZT addressed to him arrived at the bank
and were mistakenly opened by other bank employees. He claimed he was
fired because of his HIV status .... The Fourth Circuit held that
asymptomatic HIV does not "substantially limit procreation or intimate
sexual relations" for purposes of the ADA, and it went on to state in
dictum that even if procreation were a major life activity that Runnebaum
"forewent having children" because of his HIV status.
Id. at 111 (citations omitted). However, Shawrieh goes on to explain that
Hernandez u. Prudential Insurance Co., 977 F. Supp. 1160 (M.D. Fla. 1997)
produced a different result. Id. An HIV-positive gay male who wanted to have
children since a very young age but had not done so prior to his HIV diagnosis was
substantially limited in this major life activity. Id. at 1164-65. Shawrieh concludes
that there can be no predictable result for gay men under the Bragdon decision.
Shawrieh, supra note 58, at 111.
In a recent case, Blanks v. Southwestern Bell Communications, Inc., 310 F.3d
398, 402 (5th Cir. 2002), the Fifth Circuit held, in part, that Blanks, although HIV-
positive, did not qualify as disabled under the ADA because he was not "regarded"
as disabled by his employer, Southwestern Bell. Id. Blanks could only be excluded
from a narrow range of jobs (two or less) and did not demonstrate substantial
limitation in a major life activity, namely reproduction. Id. Blanks' wife
underwent a procedure to prevent her from having more children long before the
alleged discrimination took place. Id. at 401. Blanks did not want to have more
children, and therefore there was no substantial limitation of the sort found in
Bragdon. Id.
85. Smith, supra note 55, at 49.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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the Court is changing the definition of disability and narrowing
the application of the law, to the detriment of many who would
otherwise benefit from its protections.8 8
In June 1999, the Court released three employment decisions
further restricting the definition of disability under the ADA.
Commonly known as the Sutton trilogy, the cases signaled the
Court's turn toward strict formalism with respect to disability
cases.8 9 The Court reshaped legislative history and intent to limit
application of the Act.90 As a result, all claims are to be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis, and anything that might remedy or
mitigate a disability's impact, such as medical treatment or
corrective devices (but not invasive treatments), must be taken
into account when making a determination. 91
During the 2001-02 session, the Court solidified its
commitment to formalism in four landmark cases, beginning with
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.92  Ella
Williams, an automobile plant worker, worked on an engine
fabrication assembly line where she used pneumatic tools.9 3 The
tools caused pain in her hands, wrists, and arms that was
diagnosed as bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and bilateral
tendonitis. 94  Williams' personal physician placed her on
permanent work restrictions, and she asked her employer, Toyota,
88. This Article will focus on two of the four ADA cases considered by the
Supreme Court during the 2001-02 term: Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S.
Ct. 2045 (2002) and Toyota Motor Manufacturing., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 122
S. Ct. 681 (2002). The other cases are U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516,
1525 (2002), where the Court determined that ADA protections of disabled workers
rarely trump seniority rights of co-workers and Barnes v. Gorman, 122 S. Ct. 2097,
2102-03 (2002), where the Court held that municipalities are not subject to punitive
damages in private ADA cases.
89. The three cases comprising the Sutton trilogy are: Sutton v. United Airlines,
527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 527 U.S. 516 (1999); and
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkinburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
90. See infra notes 148-166 and accompanying text for a discussion of the new
ADA interpretations.
91. See Smith, supra note 55, at 50-51. In Sutton v. United Airlines, the Court
rejected twin sisters' claims of discrimination because they were not hired as
commercial airline pilots. 527 U.S. at 471. The sisters were both nearsighted and
the court concluded that corrective lenses would remedy their situation while
opening the door to some pilot positions, satisfying their career aspirations. Id. at
493. Similarly, a truck driver in Murphy v. United Parcel Service could, in the
Court's view, control hypertension with medication. 527 U.S. at 516. In
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkinburg, another truck driver had means of compensating for
his monocular vision. 527 U.S. at 555. In these decisions the Court seems to be
acknowledging the human body's natural ability to compensate for disability.
92. 122 S. Ct. 681 (2002).
93. Id. at 686.
94. Id.
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to modify her job duties. 95 She then missed work for medical leave
and filed a claim under the Kentucky Worker's Compensation
Act. 96 The claim was eventually settled, and Williams returned to
work; however, she was not satisfied with Toyota's accommodation
efforts and she filed suit, claiming that her employer had violated
the ADA.97
Having settled, Williams returned to work once again, at first
with satisfactory accommodations. 9  Her work assignment
changed, however, and Williams began to experience pain in her
neck and shoulders. 99 The in-house medical service diagnosed her
with myotendonitis bilateral periscapular (inflammation of the
muscles and tendons around her shoulder blades); myotendonitis
and myositis bilateral forearms with nerve compression causing
median nerve irritation; and thoracic outlet compression, a painful
nerve condition in the upper extremities. 100 Williams asked
Toyota to accommodate her medical condition but she claimed they
refused her request. 10 1 Toyota countered that Williams regularly
missed work.102 On December 6, 1996, Williams' last day at the
plant, her physicians placed her on a "no-work-of-any-kind
restriction," and on January 27, 1997, Toyota sent Williams a
letter terminating her employment because of "her poor
attendance record."'103 Williams sued Toyota once again, citing
their failure to reasonably accommodate her disability and unfair
termination. 10 4 Williams stated that she was "disabled" under the
ADA because her "physical impairments substantially limited her
in (1) manual tasks; (2) housework; (3) gardening; (4) playing with
her children; (5) lifting; and (6) working, all of which, she argued,
constituted major life activities under the Act."' 05 The District
Court granted Toyota's summary judgment motion, and the Court
of Appeals reversed the lower court's ruling that Williams was
disabled at the time she sought an accommodation but affirmed




98. Id. at 687.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 684.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 687.
104. Id. Respondent amended her complaint to include a violation of the Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. See Willians, 122 S. Ct. at
687.
105. Williams, 122 S. Ct. at 687.
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and wrongful termination claims. 106 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari "to consider the proper standard for assessing whether
an individual is substantially limited in performing manual
tasks."107
The Court began its analysis by stating that the ADA
requires private employers to provide "reasonable accommodations
to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or
employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that
accommodation would impose an undue hardship" and by reciting
the ADA definition for disability.10 8 The Court noted that the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) created its
own definitions for "substantial limitation" and "major life
activity."'109 The Court, after parsing out the meanings of each
word in the disability definition, focused on "substantial," stating
that it "clearly precludes impairments in only a minor way with
the performance of manual tasks from qualifying as
disabilities."'" 0 The Court went on to interpret the phrase "major
life activities" as those which "are of central importance to daily
life.""'1 In order for manual tasks to qualify as major life activities
they must "be central to daily life.' 1 2
After studying the disability definition, the Court stated that
all terms should be subjected to strict interpretation so as "to
create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled" under the
ADA.113 The Court surmised that Congress must not have
intended too broad a meaning so as to avoid an untenable number
106. Id. at 687-88.
107. Id. at 689.
108. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12102(2) (2000)). Additionally, the
Court referred to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988), and
previous decisions, including Bragdon for appropriate statutory construction, and
the Sutton trilogy for regulatory authority to interpret the term "disability." Id. at
689-90.
109. Id. at 690 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2() (2001)). Under the EEOC regulations,
"substantially limit[ed]" means "unable to perform a major life activity that the
average person in the general population can perform"; or "[slignificantly restricted
as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a
particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner or duration
under which the average person in the general population can perform that same
major life activity." Id.
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of Americans qualifying under the Act.114 The Court concluded
that an individual who is substantially limited in manual tasks
must be able to demonstrate how he or she is prevented or
severely restricted from performing activities central to daily
life. 115 Further, "the impairment's impact must also be permanent
or long-term."11 6 Medical evidence in the form of a diagnosis is not
enough to prove one's case: an "individualized assessment" is
critical because symptoms differ from person to person. 117 Finally,
the Court determined that the Act and previous decisions did not
indicate that the impairment should only be analyzed in the
context of workplace activities. 118 The ADA applies to many
venues aside from employment, demonstrating a broad reach (but
still a narrow definition of disability), and restrictions on manual
tasks specific to the workplace are not sufficient to show
substantial limitation under the ADA.119 Williams' claim failed to
meet the standards set forth by the Court. 120
ii. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal
The Williams decision set a stern, no-nonsense tone with
regard to ADA cases. By the time the Court rendered its decision
in Chevron U.S. Inc. v. Echazabal, its move toward strict
114. Id.
When it enacted the ADA in 1990, Congress found that "some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities." If Congress
intended everyone with a physical impairment that precluded the
performance of some isolated, unimportant, or particularly difficult
manual task to qualify as disabled, the number of disabled Americans
would surely have been much higher. Cf. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. at 487 (finding that because more than 100 million people need
corrective lenses to see properly, "[hlad Congress intended to include all
persons with corrected physical limitations among those covered by the
Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher number than 43




117. Id. at 691-92.
Carpal tunnel syndrome, one of the respondent's impairments, is just such
a condition. While cases of severe carpal tunnel syndrome are
characterized by muscle atrophy and extreme sensory deficits, mild cases
generally do not have either of these effects and create only intermittent
symptoms of numbness and tingling. Studies have further shown that,
even without surgical treatment, one quarter of carpel tunnel cases resolve
in one month, but in 22 percent of the cases, symptoms last for eight years
or longer.
Id. at 692 (citations omitted).
118. Id. at 693.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 694.
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interpretation, and away from a more liberal legislative intent,
was complete. 121
Mario Echazabal began working for independent contractors
at an oil refinery owned by Chevron in 1972.122 He applied for a
job with Chevron on two occasions and was informed that he had
to pass a company physical examination before hiring.1 23 Both
exams revealed liver abnormality or damage and Echazabal was
eventually diagnosed with Hepatitis C.124 Chevron's doctors
contended that Echazabal's medical condition would be
exacerbated by continued exposure to the toxins present in the
refinery. 125  Echazabal was denied a job on each occasion. 126
Further, Chevron requested that the independent contractor
reassign Echazabal to jobs either free of toxic exposure or outside
the refinery altogether. 127 The contractor laid off Echazabal in
1996.128 Echazabal filed suit claiming that Chevron violated the
ADA in refusing to hire him or allow him to work in the refinery
because of his Hepatitis C diagnosis. 29 Chevron countered that
the EEOC permitted the direct threat defense, stating that
Echazabal's disability presented a direct threat to his health on
the job.130 The District Court granted Chevron's motion for
summary judgment, and the Ninth Circuit reversed.' 3' The
Supreme Court granted certiorari because the Ninth Circuit
decision conflicted with two other decisions in the Eleventh and
Seventh Circuits.1 3
2
The court began its analysis with the statement that the
ADA prohibits "discrimina[tion] against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability ... in regard to" several
121. 122 S. Ct. 2045, 2050-51 (2002).
122. Id. at 2047-48.







130. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2001)). See also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524
U.S. 624, 648 (1998) (holding that petitioner could refuse to treat respondent if
respondent's infectious condition posed a direct threat to the safety or health of
others).
131. See Echazabal v. Cheveron U.S.A. Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir. 2000).
The parties submitted briefs to the Ninth Circuit on the question of direct threat
defense. Id. at 1066 n.3.
132. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2048 (citing Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97




employer actions, including hiring.133 Qualification standards that
"screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability"
are discriminatory. 134  The standard may also include "a
requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace" 13 if the
individual cannot safely perform the job with accommodation. 1 36
The EEOC expands the definition, allowing the employer to screen
for risks to third parties and to the worker as well.' 37
Chevron claimed that the refinery job posed a direct threat to
Echazabal's health and that the EEOC regulation precluded the
ADA.13 The Court sided with Chevron, stating that Congress
intended the "harm-to-others provision as an example of
legitimate qualifications that are 'job-related and consistent with
business necessity."' 139 The Court further stated that these "are
spacious defensive categories, which seem to give an agency (or in
the absence of agency action, a court) a good deal of discretion in
setting the limits of permissible qualification standards."' 40 Also,
the ADA itself does not expressly exclude "extrastatutory"
interpretation.14 1 The Court concluded that the omission could not
reasonably have indicated Congressional intent to consider only
the health of others in the workplace and not that of that of the
employee. 142 Chevron could rely on the EEOC standard "so long as
it makes sense of the statutory defense for qualifications
standards that are 'job-related and consistent with business
necessity."' 143 The Court viewed Chevron's reasons as legitimate,
including the avoidance of "time lost to sickness, excessive
133. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2001)).
134. Id. at 2048-49 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6)). However, the ADA provides
an affirmative defense for use of a qualification standard if the standard is "shown
to be job-related for the position in question and ... consistent with business
necessity. Id. at 2049 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b)).
135. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b)).
136. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)).
137. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2001)). "The term 'qualification
standard' may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct
threat to the health or safety of the individual or others in the workplace." 29
C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2).
138. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2049. Chevron argued that "nothing in the statute
unambiguously precludes such a defense, while the regulation was adopted under
authority explicitly delegated by Congress, 42 U.S.C. § 12116, and after notice-and-
comment rulemaking." Id.




143. Id. at 2052 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2001)).
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turnover from medical retirement or death, litigation under state
tort law, and the risk of violating the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970." 14 4
The Court noted that the EEOC definition was not an
example of "the kind of workplace paternalism the ADA was
meant to outlaw"'145 because the standard was not aimed at whole
classes of disabled people who were denied work on the basis of
"untested and pretextual stereotypes."1 46 By requiring a specific
inquiry, the EEOC provided an opportunity for a detailed
exploration of potential harms an employee might face, fulfilling
the requirements of the direct threat defense.1 47
C. HIV Disease Under the New ADA Interpretations
The Williams and Echazabal decisions have engendered
much speculation and trepidation about the future of the ADA.
Maryland Representative Steny H. Hoyer, one of the early shapers
of the ADA, believes the Court is taking too rigid an approach.1 48
The legislation was intended to be broadly interpreted so that it
would apply "not only to people who had genuine trouble
functioning normally but [to] people whose employers might
wrongly perceive them as being substantially impaired."' 49 Others
believe the Court, through its conservative approach, may be
favoring employers and leaving employees in the difficult position
of not being considered disabled until they are too disabled to
actually work, a result completely contrary to the ADA's purpose
of making American society more accessible to people with
disabilities. 50
144. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. at 2052.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2052-53.
148. Smith, supra note 55, at 50, n.40.
149. Id. at 50 (quoting Maryland. Representative Steny H. Hoyer).
150. See id. The Court "is trying to conform the ADA to a model of civil rights
legislation [by] protecting a defined minority group from outright discrimination
without inflicting undue harm on others." Id. (quoting Mark C. Rahdert, law
professor at Temple University in Philadelphia). According to the American Bar
Association (ABA) Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law, in 2001
employers prevailed in 95.7 percent of the federal court cases that reached the
merits of employee claims. Smith, supra note 55, at 50.
The ADA has been condemned for the difficulty employees have in
pursuing claims. It is said that fewer than 10 percent of all claims are
successful under the act. The meager track record stems from the "catch-
22" aspect of the law. It requires that an employee have significant
"impairment" of normal life activities in order to be qualified for coverage
under the law, yet also dictates that he or she be able to perform "the
essential functions" of the job in order to be protected under the statute.
2003] 239
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The recent ADA decisions will certainly inspire discourse
about treatment of HIV disease under the Act. The Sutton trilogy
is troubling because one could argue that individuals with HIV
disease can manage with proper drug therapies, thereby
mitigating the disability and potentially undermining the Bragdon
decision. 151  Williams could prove helpful because its essential
holding requires that the impairment suffered by an employee
must extend beyond the limitations of workplace duties. 15 2 While
some may argue quite persuasively that carpal tunnel syndrome
does extend into all aspects of life, there can be no denying that
HIV disease is always present, even when an individual is
asymptomatic.' 5 3 However, it is more likely that the Williams
decision will prove burdensome because the new emphasis on
individual evaluation will require greater reliance on medical
evidence, analysis of potential mitigating factors, the severity of
the alleged impairments, and impact of the disability on daily
life. 154 Thorough research will be critical to the success of an ADA
case. 155 There is voluminous medical evidence about HIV disease
available. Although it affects everyone differently, the one
common factor of HIV disease is lack of a cure. 15 6 Asymptomatic
individuals are still experiencing, on a cellular level, significant
changes because of the virus. 157 If litigants want to overcome the
Williams burdens, they will have to prove that these changes are
significant, ongoing, and unique. Litigation, therefore, could be
extensive and expensive because of the necessary reliance on
expert medical evidence and testimony.
Echazabal presents the biggest concern for individuals with
HIV disease. The decision gives employers considerable power in
deciding when working conditions pose a direct threat to the
employee. 158 Medical information manipulated in such a manner
Thus, the employee needs to be quite afflicted in order to be qualified, but
the affliction must not be so great that it impedes the employee's work
abilities. Consequently only a small number of employees are able to
prevail under the statute and its state counterparts.
Marshall H. Tanick, Privacy of Medical Records in Minnesota: Hippocrates or
Hyprocrisy?, THE HENNEPIN LAWYER, May 2001, 10, 25.
151. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
152. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 122 S. Ct. 681, 681 (2002).
153. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637 (concluding that even during an asymptomatic
phase the virus still actively attacks white blood cells and lymph nodes).
154. Smith, supra note 55, at 51.
155. Id.
156. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637.
157. Id.
158. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045, 2049-53 (2002).
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as to support an employer's belief could become a pretextual tool
for discrimination. According to Ronda Goldfein, Executive
Director of the AIDS Law Project of Pennsylvania, "all you need is
some bad science to say there's a threat to the person, and you can
essentially tell them, 'you don't have enough sense to protect
yourself, so we're going to do it for you."' 159 Individuals with HIV
disease have reason to distrust such a paternalistic scenario
because similar arguments have already been used to deny
services and opportunities that HIV-negative persons would
automatically expect to receive, including organ transplants,
plastic surgery, and pregnancy. 160 Health care workers with HIV
could be denied employment because of possible exposure to
infections, as could teachers who spend hours a day with children
carrying a host of contagions, or police officers and firefighters who
experience high stress and physical demands on the job. 161
Taken to the extreme, Echazabal gives an employer license to
place an HIV-positive employee in the least demanding dead-end
position, rationalizing it as an "accommodation."'162 The potential
for discrimination, even by a well-intentioned employer, has been
raised by the Echazabal decision. 163  The decision creates a
disincentive for employees with HIV disease to disclose their
health status to employers or submit to qualifying physical exams
for fear of triggering a chain of events similar to that experienced
by Mario Echazabal. 164 This distrust could keep many qualified
individuals with HIV disease from pursuing work. Few will have
the resources to actually gather all of the extensive documentation
available, and now necessary, to mount a successful ADA claim if
discrimination occurs. 16 5 The HIV community is correct in viewing
this ruling with considerable skepticism. 166
159. Adams, supra note 3, at 19.
160. Id.
"People with HIV have been turned away for years when they needed liver
transplants under the argument that their compromised immune system
makes it not likely for them to survive. They've been denied cosmetic
surgery under that claims that it wouldn't be good for them. HIV-positive
women are discouraged from becoming pregnant. There's a whole range of
things that HIV-positive people are regularly denied because it's supposed
to be for their own good."
Id. (quoting Catherine Hanssens, Director of Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund's AIDS Project).
161. Adams, supra note 3, at 19.
162. Id. at 19-20.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 15-20.
165. Id. See also supra notes 3-11 (noting the many consequences of disclosure).
166. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 3, at 19 (noting the thin divide between actual
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III. Emerging Privacy Policies and Their Impact on HIV
Disease
A. HIV and the Workplace: Employee Expectations of
Accommodation and Privacy
As the recent Supreme Court cases indicate, employment
presents one of the most complicated contexts for accommodating
individuals with disabilities. 16 7  Employees with HIV disease
encounter many obstacles in the workplace. Therefore, advocates
need to pay particular attention to the nuances of disclosure,
confidentiality, medical records protection, and accommodation in
employment settings when handling HIV-related claims. The
CDC has estimated that every United States company will, at
some point, have at least one employee with HIV disease on the
payroll. 165 Yet many problems arise because employers are often
ill-prepared when it comes to protecting the privacy rights and
accommodating the needs of employees with HIV disease.1
69
Privacy is a primary concern for HIV-positive employees.
The problems of stigma and social ostracism associated with HIV
disease are as compelling in the workplace as any other setting.
170
Further, confusion abounds regarding the direct threat defense
under the ADA, and courts are constantly faced with the problem
of balancing employee rights with employer interests.' 71 Although
concern for an employee's well-being and discrimination).
167. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
168. Bless S. Young & Kimberly R. Wells, Managing AIDS in the Workplace, 41
PRAC. LAw., Apr. 1995, 41, 42. The information referenced in this section was
compiled by Heather C. Sawyer, Senior Staff Attorney, LAMBDA Legal Defense
(http://www.lambdalegal.org (last visited Jan. 17, 2003)), and Lynn Mickelson, for a
presentation at the Hennepin County Bar Association entitled Reasonable
Accommodation and Privacy Concerns for Employees with HIV and AIDS on Feb.
22, 2002.
169. Young & Wells, supra note 168, at 42. Most AIDS-related problems in the
workplace arise because many employers are unaware of how to deal with AIDS.
Id. They are unaware of legal issues and how that impacts on medical and social
security benefits. Id. They are uninformed about the medical aspects of this issue.
Id.
170. Greenfield, supra note 4, at 278-79. "Disclosure of an employee's AIDS
status will usually result in emotional harm to the employee and may also result in
actual or threatened physical harm. This is due largely to the fact that stereotypes
continue to exist, despite the abundance of AIDS-related information available."
Id. at 281.
171. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 122 S. Ct.
681, 694 (2002) (finding employee's medical condition did not meet ADA
requirements); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045, 2045-46 (2002)
(holding that an employer can make decisions about an employee's ability to do job
based on disability and job requirements during the hiring process). See also
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substantial medical evidence shows that HIV disease is not readily
transmitted in workplace settings, employers remain concerned
about exposure as well as the perception of the HIV-positive
employee by other employees, customers or clients. 72  Such
concern can easily turn into discriminatory action, especially if the
HIV-positive employee is fired, demoted, forced to resign,
harassed, or not reasonably accommodated. 73
An employee's voluntary disclosure of health status usually
accompanies a request for accommodation. Many persons with
HIV disease suffer disruptive side effects from medications. 174
They must also adhere to regimented diets and mealtimes to
Cavico, supra note 13, at 1345:
The employee's right to privacy, however, is a relative right. It requires a
balance between the contending interests of the employee's personal
privacy expectations and the employer's traditional interests in quality,
performance and productivity. Courts customarily balance the conflicting
interests of employers and employees through the common law of torts.
Id. In Cronan v. New England Telephone, Co., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1273, 1274 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 1986), a supervisor published an employee's
health status to other employees. Id. The employee received many threatening
phone calls and letters and did not return to work because he feared for his life.
Some of his coworkers threatened to lynch him. Id. The case settled out of court,
presumably because the employer could not show how publication of the employee's
health information could have furthered any legitimate business purpose.
Greenfield, supra note 3, at 295. The employer's motion to dismiss was denied by
the court. Cronan, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1279.
172. See, e.g., Laura Pincus, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Employers New
Responsibilities to HIV-Positive Employees, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 561, 562 (1993)
(noting that despite extensive evidence showing that in most cases HIV-positive
employees are able to perform at the same level as other employees and without
risk of contagion, employers still harbor concerns about whether their business will
be adversely affected by an employee's HIV-positive status).
173. Young & Wells, supra note 168, at 52. Under the ADA, discrimination is
defined to include an employer's failure to make "reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability, who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodations would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business of such covered entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2001).
Examples of reasonable accommodation in the statute include "job restructuring,
part-time or modified work schedules, [and / or] reassignment to a vacant position."
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2002) (providing a non-
exhaustive list of potential reasonable accommodations). The Appendix to Part
1630 - Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the ADA - also includes use of accrued
paid leave or allowing additional unpaid leave (note that there may be some
overlap with the employer's obligation under the Family and Medical Leave Act,
which provides up to 12 weeks unpaid leave if certain criteria are met). 29 C.F.R.
app. pt. 1630. The appendix explains that job restructuring only requires
restructuring of marginal job functions - an employer is not required to reallocate
essential job functions, which are those functions the employee would have to
perform, with or without reasonable accommodation, to be considered qualified. Id.
174. See Webcast, supra note 3.
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satisfy rigorous medication schedules. 175 Impairments that are
characteristic manifestations of an underlying disability are
considered part of the underlying disability and therefore must be
accommodated. 176 Accommodations for employees with HIV can
range from flexible break time; relocation of the work area closer
to a restroom; flexible start and end times; light duty,
reassignment to a different, equivalent position; and intermittent
leave.177
In Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc.,178 a group of HIV-
positive airline pilots alleged that the employer had a duty to help
them find other positions with the airline. 79 The court held that
an employer who knows of a disability has an affirmative duty to
inform the employee of other suitable job opportunities and to
determine whether the employee is interested in and qualified for
those positions. 8 0 This obligation exists so long as no undue
hardship is placed on the employer or if the employer has a similar
policy for other (non-disabled) employees. 181
An employer must accommodate the "known physical or
mental limitations" of an employee. 8 2  Some courts have
interpreted this to require employees to request help or assistance
in accommodating his or her disability, but some have required the
employer to share the burden as well. 8 3 The employee need not,
175. See HIV Education Prison Project (HEPP), HIV 101: Sunmary of
Antiretroviral Agents, Dosing and Administration Recommendations, available at
http://www.thebody.com/hivatis/pdfs/adult-guidelines.pdf (last visited Feb. 8,
2003). Schedules vary depending on an individual's type and combination of
medications. Id at 45-50. Each medication has different requirements. Id. For
example, the protease inhibitor, Indinavir (Crixivan), must be taken either one
hour before or two hours after a meal, while another protease inhibitor Amprenavir
(Agenevase) can be taken with or without food but high fat meals should be
avoided. Id. The Non-Nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitor Efavirenz
(Sustiva) is also affected by high fat meals. Id. The Nuceloside Reverse
Transcriptase Inhibitor Abacavir (ABC, Ziagen) is affected by alcohol. Id.
176. See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding that paraplegic employee's pressure ulcers are part of her disability
and therefore part of what employer must accommodate).
177. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
178. 53 Cal. App. 4th 935 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1997).
179. Id at 944.
180. Id at 947-48.
181. Id. The ADA requires reasonable accommodation unless an employer can
establish that the accommodation would impose an "undue hardship." 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5)(A) (2001).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
183. See, e.g., Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co., 991 F.2d 645, 649-50 (10th Cir.
1993) (recognizing defendant employer's lack of knowledge of employee's HIV
infection as a successful defense in employment discrimination action). See also
Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 260-62 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding
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however, invoke the exact statutory terms to satisfy this burden;
plain English is sufficient. 184 The EEOC requires an "interactive
process" for the accommodation request. 185  The "interactive
process" is used "[to] identify the precise limitations resulting from
the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could
overcome those limitations."'186 The EEOC guidance identifies four
steps: (1) analyze the job and determine essential functions; (2)
consult with the employee to determine precise job-related
limitations and how to overcome those with reasonable
accommodation; (3) consult with the employee to identify potential
accommodations and their effectiveness; (4) consider the
employee's preference (although employer is not bound by the
employee's choice) and select the accommodation most appropriate
for the employee and employer. 87 Even though the EEOC places
the burden of compliance primarily on the employer, courts have
found that employees share this burden and must engage in open
communication with the employer.18 8
Reasonable accommodation has been an issue in cases
involving health care workers terminated after their employer
learns of their diagnosis. 189 In many cases, employers have argued
employee's request must be "sufficiently direct and specific" and provide notice of
specific accommodation).
184. See, e.g., Miller v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 107 F.3d 483, 486-87 (7th Cir. 1997)
(holding an injured employee's statement that "I want to keep working for you - do
you have any suggestions?" was sufficient to trigger employer's duty to
accommodate).
185. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2002).
186. Id.
187. See 29 C.F.R. app. pt. 1630.
188. See Vawser v. Fred Meyer, Inc., No. 00-36081, 2001 WL 1174084, at *2 (9th
Cir. Oct. 4, 2001) (finding that employer was not liable for failure to accommodate
employee with HIV where employee's doctor failed to respond to employer's request
for clarification of requested accommodation). The Eighth Circuit set out a four-
part test for plaintiffs to prove that an employer failed to engage in the interactive
process in good faith:
(1) the employer knew about the employee's disability; (2) the employee
requested accommodations or assistance for his or her disability; (3) the
employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the employee in seeking
accommodations; and (4) the employee could have been reasonably
accommodated but for the employer's lack of good faith.
Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952 (8th Cir. 1999).
189. See, e.g., Bradley v. Univ. ofTex., 3 F.3d 922, 924-25 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
that HIV-positive surgical technician could not perform essential function of being
in operative field); Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398, 403-07 (6th
Cir. 1998) (determining that employer was not required to accommodate HIV-
positive operating room technician by providing assistance for team where he was
required to place hand in or about incisions to help doctor view); Waddell v. Valley
Forge Dental Assoc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that a dental
hygienist posed a "significant risk" to patients "even though the risk [of
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that health care workers with HIV disease pose a direct threat to
themselves and others, and that no reasonable accommodation can
reduce this threat to a level that would enable HIV-positive
employees to perform their jobs.190 Employers have been
successful in convincing courts that any accommodation would be
unreasonable because employers would have to hire "full-time"
assistants to perform the essential functions of HIV-positive
employees' jobs. 19 1
Minnesota laws 192 and federal laws193 require all medical
records be kept confidential and separate from other personnel
records. 194 The Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) 195 and the
transmission] is small and such an event never before has occurred"). But see
Parks v. Female Health Care Assoc., 96-C7133, 1997 WL 285870, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
May 23, 1997) (rejecting an employer-hospital's argument that, as a matter of law,
an HIV-positive surgeon or surgical technician is a direct threat and not otherwise
qualified as a factual inquiry could prove "reasonable accommodations" would
enable the employee "to carry out her essential job functions").
190. See supra note 189.
191. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
192. MINN. STAT. § 363.02, subd. 1(9)(i)(d) (2002).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)-(4) (2002); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c)(1) (2002).
194. See MINN. STAT. § 144.335, subd. 3a(a) (2002). The Health Records and
Reports Act applies to anyone who has received health care services. Id. It
prohibits the divulging of health records "without a signed and dated consent from
the patient or the patient's legally authorized representative." Id. Under the ADA,
information regarding medical condition or history must be "collected and
maintained on separate forms and in separate medical files and ... treated as a
confidential medical record." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B). Exceptions are made in
limited circumstances, including for restrictions on work, accommodations or in
emergencies when first aid personnel require information. Id.
The common law right of privacy, recently recognized in Minnesota, has not had
an impact on medical record confidentiality decisions. See Lake v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 232-36 (Minn. 1998). The Minnesota Supreme Court
held that a woman's photograph of two nude friends in shower developed at Wal-
Mart and distributed to members of the community without consent was an
actionable tort. Id. at 235. The court stated:
Today we join the majority of jurisdictions and recognize the tort of
invasion of privacy. The right of privacy is an integral part of our
humanity; one has a public persona, exposed and active, and a private
persona, guarded and preserved. The heart of our liberty is choosing
which parts of our lives shall become public, and which parts we shall hold
close.
Id. The court declared "[an] [i]ntrusion upon seclusion occurs when one
'intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns ... if the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person."' Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652B (1977)). Highly offensive conduct cannot be merely "callous" or "petty" and
must be considered in the context of the entire course of conduct. This is a fact-
specific analysis. See Bauer v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 140 F.Supp.2d 1019, 1024-25
(D. Minn. 2001). See also Bauer v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 149 F.Supp.2d 1106,
1111 (D. Minn. 2001) (holding credit company's repossession efforts despite
plaintiffs statement that he was not the correct target of the repossession were
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ADA cover medical information obtained in the course of a post-
offer/pre-employment medical examination, inquiries into the
ability of employees to perform job-related functions, and
examinations that are job-related and consistent with business
necessity. 196  The ADA's confidentiality provision is broad,
covering both disabled and non-disabled employees.1 9  For
example, supervisors and managers may receive medical
information only in cases where necessary work restrictions or
"offensive to a reasonable person" and amounted to an intrusion upon the plaintiffs
right to seclusion); C.L.D. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 79 F.Supp.2d 1080, 1087-88 (D.
Minn. 1999) (deciding against an employee who alleged her pregnancy and abortion
were improperly disclosed by a supervisor to one of the employee's co-workers
because the publication of the information was not sufficiently widespread); Walker
v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., Co., 2000 WL 520254, at *1, *6-8 (Minn. Ct. App. May
2, 2000) (holding even though caseworker's behavior was "petty and totally
unworthy of a professional," it was not a sufficient intrusion into the employee's
privacy where an injured employee sued his employer because the worker's
compensation case manager obtained his medical records, shared the information
with the employer and accompanied the employee to medical appointments). See
generally Neal T. Buethe, Things to Come in Minnesota: Ways in Which the Privacy
Tort Has Affected Employment Law in Other States, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 38 (1999);
Nicholas D. Bieter, Minnesota's Right of Privacy Torts: Expanding Common Law
Beyond Its Reasonable Constitutional Bounds in Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 177 (1999); Joseph Schmitt, Courts and Employers
Struggle Over Privacy Issues Since Lake, THE HENNEPIN LAWYER, Feb. 2002, at 10;
Marshall H. Tanick, Reflections on Lake: The State of the Right to Privacy in
Minnesota, BENCH & BAR, Oct. 2000, at 41; Karin Peterson & Mary Setter,
Minnesota Recognizes the Common Law Tort of Invasion of Privacy, THE HENNEPIN
LAWYER, Dec. 1998, at 4.
195. MINN. STAT. ch. 363 (2002).
196. See id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B) (2002) (requiring that medical
information must kept in separate files). See generally Schmitt, supra note 194, at
10-11 (discussing the laws governing medical information).
197. See Cossette v. Minnesota Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 969 (8th Cir. 1999).
In analyzing the ADA's medical record confidentiality provisions, the court stated:
The plain language of subsections (d)(3) and (d)(4) speaks of "employees"
and "applicants" - suggesting that Cossette need not be disabled in order
to recover. This language stands in stark contrast to the ADA's general
prohibition of disability discrimination, which provides that employers
shall not "discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability." 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). Although subsection (d)(1) provides that
subsection (a)'s general prohibition against discrimination shall include
discrimination on the basis of medical examinations and inquiries, that
provision is only one of several protections afforded by subsection (d), and
it is only discrimination itself (and not illegal disclosure) that requires a
showing of disability.
Id. (emphasis omitted). Some courts have found that medical information provided
voluntarily by an employee, not in pursuit of accommodation, and not requested by
the employer, is not protected by the ADA. In Rohan v. Networks Presentation
LLC, 175 F.Supp.2d 806 (D. Md. 2001), the court held that an employee who
provided a "voluntary medical history" when she discussed her disability with her
managers was not protected because she did not provide the information as part of
an "employee health program" at the work site. Id. at 814.
20031
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accommodations are required. 198
Cossette v. Minnesota Power & Light' 99 is a recent example of
a medical records case in which actual disability is not equated
with the employee's right to confidentiality about medical
history.200 In Cossette, an employee with a back injury requiring
lifting restrictions, sought a new job.201 Her supervisor learned of
the employee's job search and informed the prospective employer,
without the employee's consent, about the employee's injury and
work restrictions. 20 2 When the employee was turned down for the
job because of the breach in confidentiality about her medical
condition, she sued her employer under the ADA. 20 3 The court
determined that she was not disabled because her injury did not
sufficiently impair her daily activities. 20 4 Nonetheless, the court
held that the unauthorized disclosure of her medical information
was a violation of the ADA. 20 5 Even though she was not disabled
under the Act, 20 6 Cossette could, still demonstrate that her
employer's violation caused some sort of tangible injury. 20 7
Summary judgment in favor of the employer was reversed, and the
case was eventually settled in favor of the employee.
20 8
State and federal regulations, as well as developing case law,
indicate that employees with HIV disease will face significant
challenges in accommodation and breach of confidentiality
cases. 209 Insurance is an additional consideration. 210 Many HIV-
198. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B). First aid and safety personnel may have access
to the information during emergency situations and government officials may have
access for purposes of compliance efforts. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B)(i)-(iii).
199. 188 F.3d 964.
200. Id. at 969.
201. Id. at 966-68.
202. Id. at 967-68.
203. Id. at 969-70.
204. Id. at 970-71.
205. Id. at 971.
206. See id. at 969-70 (citing Fredenburg v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Health
Serv., 172 F.3d 1176, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 1999) and Griffin u. Steeltek, Inc., 160 F.3d
591, 593-94 (10th Cir. 1998), and holding a "plaintiff need not be disabled to state a
claim for the unauthorized gathering or disclosure of confidential medical
information").
207. Id. at 970 (citing Griffin, 160 F.3d at 594-95, and Armstrong v. Turner
Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 554, 562 (5th Cir. 1998) (assuming without deciding that non-
disabled plaintiff may proceed under subsection (d)(2), applicant must show "some
cognizable injury in fact of which the violation is a legal and proximate cause for
damages to arise from a single violation")).
208. Id. at 964.
209. See generally Greenfield, supra note 4, at 282-87 (highlighting a host of
difficulties employees face in bringing breach of confidentiality suits).
210. See generally Joel L. Hodes, Corporate America's Response to the AIDS
248 [Vol. 21:219
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positive employees have health insurance provided by the
employer. 21 1 Some employers, however, in order to avoid rising
costs, have placed limits or caps on existing health insurance
benefits or excluded certain conditions from coverage. 2 12 Except
for pre-existing conditions, universal limits or exclusions, and
coverage limitations on treatments not exclusive to a particular
disability, the EEOC has determined some of these disabilities-
based measures are discriminatory. 213
B. Privacy and Discrimination Protection in the Public and
Private Sectors
i. Minnesota Government Data Practices Act: Public
Protection
The remainder of this Article will summarize existing
Minnesota privacy law and new federal privacy guidelines with
the goal of proposing a state law that will provide additional
protections to individuals with HIV disease in light of the stigma
associated with the health condition.
Minnesota has been a trailblazer in state privacy protections.
Its comprehensive data privacy law, now known as the Minnesota
Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA), was the first of its kind
in the United States. 21 4 The Legislature enacted the MGDPA in
1973, but the 1979 revisions created the "presumption that
government data are public and are accessible by the public for
both inspection and copying unless there is a federal law, a state
statute, or a temporary classification of data that provides that
Crisis: What Price Glory?, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1998) (showing the large
number of HIV infected persons in America's work force).
211. See, e.g., id. at 1092-94 (discussing the role corporate health care plays in
providing for HIV-positive individuals).
212. See, e.g., Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Donaghey, No. 93-
1154, 1993 WL 944580, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1996) (holding a union health
plan excluding AIDS-related claims violated the ADA).
213. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2002); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(o (2002). See also Robert
E. Stein, The Rights of Employees with AIDS: The Conflict Between the Need for
Adequate Insurance Coverage and Individual Privacy in the Workplace, 10 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 557, 559 (1995) (discussing conditions that are or
should be covered from discriminatory actions); Catherine Hanssens, Healthcare
Insurance, AIDS and the ADA, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 567, 568-71
(1995) (discussing prohibited employer actions that result in altering benefit
schemes created by ERISA).
214. See Mike Mosedale, Data Man, CITY PAGES, Jan. 9, 2002, available at
http://www.citypages.com/databank/23/110/articlel0061.asp. The MGDPA is




certain data are not public."2 15 The MGDPA protects the privacy
of medical information collected by state agencies, political
subdivisions, or statewide systems (i.e., the state welfare
system).2 16 Subjects may request copies of their MGDPA data. 217
Information can be released without consent subject to court order,
emergency situation, or statutory obligation for mandatory
reporting. 218 Persons harmed by unauthorized releases of publicly
collected data are entitled to damages up to $10,000 per violation,
plus costs and attorneys fees.21
9
Use of information collected in the context of government
practices is of great concern to persons with HIV disease. A recent
family law case at Minnesota AIDS Project (MAP) involved a
parenting time evaluation conducted by a county court services
office. 220 Although the evaluator obtained a consent form from the
client to verify her health condition, the client, as well as her
attorney and the presiding judicial officer, were shocked to
discover that the evaluator had gathered voluminous documents
about the client's pregnancy with a child who was not even the
subject of the family court case. From the beginning of his
investigation, the evaluator had expressed inordinate interest in
the fact that the client became pregnant after her HIV diagnosis.
Although the client explained that many women, with proper
medical care and specific medications, are able to give birth to
children free of HIV disease, 22' the evaluator remained skeptical.
The collected medical documents were irrelevant to the case and
indicated that the evaluator, who had mentioned the term "child
endangerment" in relation to the client's pregnancy, had a
discriminatory motive. The file was available to the child's father,
who had been abusive to the client in the past. The client and the
child's father were no longer involved. Fortunately, he did not
view the records. The judicial officer ordered that the records be
215. MINN. STAT. § 13.01, subd. 3.
216. MINN. STAT. § 13.02, subd. 12. See also Minnesota Medical Records Act,
MINN. STAT. § 144.335 (2002).
217. MINN. STAT. §§ 13.03-.04.
218. MINN. STAT. §§ 13.07-.08, 13.43.
219. MINN. STAT § 13.08, subd. 1.
220. For reasons evident in the subject matter of this Article, the author wishes
to keep details of cases which MAP has provided assistance confidential. For more
information, please contact MAP Legal Services at (612) 341-2060.
221. See, e.g., PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USE
OF ANTIRETROVIRAL DRUGS IN PREGNANT HIV-1-INFECTED WOMEN FOR MATERNAL
HEALTH AND INTERVENTIONS TO REDUCE PERINATAL HIV-1 TRANSMISSION IN THE
UNITED STATES 2 (Aug. 30, 2002), available at
http://www.aidsinfo. nih.gov/guidelines/perinatal/Perinatal.pdf.
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removed from the investigator's file and returned to the client,
who was embarrassed by the many private details disclosed about
her obstetric history and gynecological health. Complaints were
made to the county court services office and chief family law judge,
but it is unknown whether the evaluator experienced any
consequences for his actions. The county did not accept an offer of
a free training from MAP.
The actions of the court evaluator indicated an abuse of
government authority and a failure to protect private information.
Under the MGDPA, the responsible authority has a duty to "(1)
establish procedures to assure all data on individuals is accurate,
complete, and current for the purposes for which it was collected;
and (2) establish appropriate security safeguards for all records
containing data on individuals."222 The episode demonstrated that
the county had not provided sufficient education about HIV and
pregnancy to workers investigating family law cases, and failed to
adequately protect the information collected. 223
As the case described above illustrates, the MGDPA provides
important protections in the public context. Public trust cannot be
maintained without such safeguards. Government has a duty, to
use and protect personal information. If it fails in this duty then
the public cannot cooperate with the government in activities
designed to better the individual and society.
ii. Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act: Private
Protection
As in the case of the MGDPA, Minnesota has been a leader in
adopting human rights protections. The federal Civil Rights Act of
1964 was actually preceded by the MHRA, which was passed in
1955.224 Today, employment discrimination eases in Minnesota
are considered in the context of the MHRA, the ADA, and Title
VII.225 The MHRA also includes prohibitions on discrimination
222. MINN. STAT. § 13.05, subd. 5.
223. Education is important in the context of family law actions. Opposing
parties, for instance, are quick to use HIV as evidence of poor moral character on
the part of the positive parent and proffer this evidence as reason for denying
custody or access based on the best interests of the child. Such arguments fail, for
the most part, because under Minnesota law the disability of a parent or legal
custodian is not "determinative of the custody of the child, unless the proposed
custodial arrangement is not in the best interest of the child." MINN. STAT. §
518.17, subd. l(a)(9) (2002). A parent's HIV status, in other words, would prove
relevant only if the parent was so debilitated that he or she could not care for the
child.
224. MINN. STAT. ch. 363, §§ 363.01-.20 (2002).
225. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2002) (prohibiting discrimination in the terms
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based on disability and sexual orientation.226
Title VII and the MHRA differ in many respects, which has
led to some conflicts in application and practice. 227 Compared to
the MHRA, the standard for establishing discrimination under
Title VII is very rigorous. 25 Title VII litigants have to prove that
the alleged discrimination was unwelcome, perpetuated because of
protected status, and severe enough to affect the plaintiffs
working conditions and create an abusive working environment.229
Administrative remedies, such as filing a charge with the EEOC,
must be exhausted before a Title VII claim can be filed in the court
system. 230 MHRA claimants, on the other hand, may file suit in
court and pursue charges of discrimination with the Department
of Human Rights (DHR) after a showing of probable cause is made
through a DHR investigation. 231 Further, Title VII narrowly
defines liability: only employers, as defined by the statute, can be
liable for discrimination. 232  Supervisors, however, are not
considered employers. 233  The MHRA extends liability to any
person who directly or indirectly attempts to "aid, abet, incite,
compel, or coerce a person" to engage in unlawful discrimination
as defined by the statute.234 Under the MHRA, the employer is
and conditions of employment based on race, color religion, sex, or national origin).
See also Sheila Engelmeier & Jonathan J. Hegre, The Deepening Divide: Minnesota
and Federal Employment Laws, BENCH & BAR, Apr. 2001, at 21 (providing an
overview of the evolving federal and state laws with a particular emphasis on
changes at the federal level that affect the interplay between the two systems in
employment cases).
226. MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subds. 13, 41a.
227. See Engelmeier & Hegre, supra note 225, at 22.
228. See id. at 21-24 (highlighting the growing divide between the ADA and the
MHRA as courts are more strictly interpreting the ADA).
229. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786-90 (1998); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998) (discussing the elements which
must be proven for a Title VII claim to be successful).
230. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2002) (governing enforcement provisions).
231. MINN. STAT. § 363.06, subd. 1. Claimants under the MHRA have one year
from when the discriminatory act was committed to commence suit or file a charge
with MHRA. MINN. STAT. § 363.06, subd. 3. Depending on how the suit is
commenced, claimants under Title VII have either one hundred eighty to three
hundred days to file a charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(e)(1).
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a). An employer is "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year, and any agent of such person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(b). The MHRA protects
employees no matter the size of the employer. MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(2);
MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 17.
233. See Bonomolo-Hagen v. Clay Central-Everly Cmty. Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 446,
447 (8th Cir. 1997).
234. MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 6.
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also vicariously liable when it "knows or should know of the
existence of the harassment and fails to take timely appropriate
action."235 Finally, Title VII and the MHRA differ with respect to
compensatory and punitive damages. Title VII caps awards in
federal discrimination cases in accordance with the size of the
employer's workforce. 236 The MHRA, however, places no limit on
compensatory damages but caps punitive damages. 237
Employment discrimination cases are common in the MAP
legal program. For example, an employee at a fast-food chain
reported a supervisor informing a co-worker, in the employee's
presence and without his consent, about the employee's HIV
status. The co-worker then told other employees and customers,
creating a hostile working environment for the HIV-positive
worker. In another case, an employee of an overnight delivery
carrier was denied accommodation and subsequently harassed for
disclosing his status. An assistant to housebound individuals lost
work hours once she informed her employer of her medical
condition. A security guard told his supervisor and was
subsequently terminated on a false claim that he was sleeping on
the job.
What separates HIV-related employment cases from other
cases is the significance of disclosure. Often an employee with
HIV disease need not tell anyone of his or her condition. 238 Even
accommodation requests can be based on a doctor's
recommendation describing a chronic illness requiring certain
work restrictions.239 Only certain jobs, usually in the health care
235. MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 6(2). Courts have imputed liability to an
employer in sexual harassment actions. See, e.g., Guiliani v. Stuart Corp., 512
N.W.2d 589, 595 (Minn. App. 1994) (noting the relationship between a manager
and employer, and imputing liability on an agency theory); Kay v. Peter Motor Co.,
Inc., 483 N.W.2d 481, 484-85 (Minn. App. 1992) (finding liability when an employer
should have known of the manager's conduct). But see Weaver v. Minnesota Valley
Labs, Inc., 470 N.W.2d 131, 134-35 (Minn. App. 1991) (refusing to impute liability
when an employer had specific procedures in place to report harassment and such
procedures were not followed); Heaser v. Lerch, Bates & Assocs., 467 N.W.2d 833,
835 (Minn. App. 1991) (finding no imputed liability when the employer has
implemented an objectionable behavior policy that includes a clear procedure for
reporting harassment on the job).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2001).
237. MINN. STAT. § 363.071, subd. 2. Claimants can receive up to "three times
the actual damages sustained" in compensatory damages and up to $8,500 per
incident in punitive damages. Id.
238. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
239. See supra text accompanying note 175. Accommodation requests involve
disclosure of "precise limitations resulting from the disability," not disclosure of the
precise nature of the illness.
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field, require full disclosure. 240 A breach in confidentiality not only
creates a potentially hostile work environment but also negatively
affects the employee's health because of the associated stress.
241
Sharing information without consent, inquiring after a person's
HIV status, or taking an unauthorized HIV test would be
considered "highly offensive to a reasonable person" under the
invasion of privacy law "because it would provide knowledge of the
most vivid details of one's present health and in some cases allow
inferences about one's intimate behavior."242  The dangers
associated with such knowledge require additional vigilance and
caution in fashioning discrimination and privacy laws with respect
to HIV disease. 243
iii. Proposed Medical Records Privacy Act Amendments:
The Need for Expansive Policy in Minnesota
Many people are concerned about medical information
privacy and wonder how effective protections designed to guard
their health records really are. 244 In 1996, Congress passed the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), a
sweeping measure designed to improve access to health insurance
by updating medical privacy protections for people who move from
one job to another, are self-employed, or have pre-existing medical
conditions. 245  HIPAA required the Clinton Administration to
240. MINN. STAT. § 214.19. subds. 1, 2 (2002) (requiring mandatory reporting of
infectious disease for certain licensed health care workers).
241. See generally Dr. Jeffrey M. Leiphart, AIDS Survival Project: Survival News
(Nov. 2000), at http://www.thebody.com/asp/novOO/stresshiv.html (noting that
"[s]ustained stress erodes immune function and hastens the onset of AIDS").
242. Greenfield, supra note 3, at 291. See also Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582
N.W.2d 231, 236 (Minn. 1998) (holding that a person's liberty interest includes
choosing what personal information will be private or public). If inquiry is for
purposes of support, there is likely no improper disclosure. Cf. McNemar v. Disney
Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 622 (3rd Cir. 1996) (finding that a district manager's
approaching of an employee to determine whether rumors about the employee's
health status were true was not an intrusion because it was a statement of support,
he did not have to reply, and the conduct was not highly offensive to a reasonable
person).
243. See supra note 242.
244. "One in five American adults believes that a health care provider, insurance
plan, government agency or employer has improperly disclosed personal medical
information. Half of these people believe that it resulted in personal
embarrassment or harm." Health Privacy Project, Health Privacy Polling Data 1
(Jan. 1999), available at http://www.healthprivacy.org/usr-doc/PollingData90l.pdf
(citing a January 1999 survey conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates).
245. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191
(1996). The laws became effective April 14, 2001; most health plans and health
care providers must be in compliance by April 2003. See Peter A. Winn,
Confidentiality In Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the Common Law, 33
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adopt rules protecting the privacy of health information.246 After
an extensive notice period over which some 52,000 comments were
submitted, the new rules were issued in December, 2000.247 The
Bush Administration re-opened the comment period for thirty days
on February 28, 2001 in order to address concerns raised by health
care companies. 248  The Health and Human Services
Administration (HHS) under Secretary Tommy Thompson then
proposed changes including the elimination of a prior consent
requirement before health care providers use or disclose health
care information. 249
RUTGERS L.J. 617, 640-41 (2002). "The new rules are important because they set
legal limits on how health-related information can be used. Prior to the new rules,
virtually no protections were in place. Palmer & Mickelson, supra note 7, at 473.
In fact, medical records were not as protected as credit reports or even video rental
records." Id. See also Mary K. Martin, Some Things Old, Some Things New: The
HIPAA Health Information Privacy Regulations, BENCH & BAR, May / June 2002,
at 32 (providing an overview of HIPAA and Minnesota Medical Records Act).
246. See Winn, supra note 198, at 639-40.
247. Id. at 640.
248. See Robert Pear, Democrats Say Bush Revisions Ruin Medical Privacy Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2002, at A16.
249. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Proposes Changes
that Protect Privacy, Access to Care, HHS NEWS (Mar. 21, 2002), at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2002pres/20020321a.html [hereinafter HHS Fact
Sheet].
This proposal to eliminate the consent requirement strikes at the very
heart of the Privacy Rule and takes away a core privacy protection for
consumers. The Privacy Rule's consent requirement is intended to bolster
patient trust and confidence in providers and in health care organizations
by respecting the patient's central role in making health care decisions.
The Department's proposal ... will undermine trust in the health care
system.
Health Privacy Project, Comments On Proposed Modifications to Federal Standards
for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, Apr. 26, 2002, available
at http://www.healthprivacy.org/usr-doc/NPRMHPPComments.pdf [hereinafter
Comments]. HHS claimed that the proposal "would promote access to care by
removing the consent requirements that would potentially interfere with the
efficient delivery of health care, while strengthening requirements for providers to
notify patients about their privacy rights and practices." Supra, HHS Fact Sheet.
Another troubling proposal was a change undermining the ability of minors to
seek confidential treatment without notification of their parents or guardians. Id.
One favorable proposal included tighter provisions regulating the use of health care
information for marketing purposes. Id. See also Health Privacy Project, HHS
Proposals Both Undermine and Enhance Privacy, Mar. 21, 2002, available at
http://www.healthprivacy.org/usr.doc/pressIrelease.pdf.
The Clinton rules required doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers to
obtain written consent from patients before using personal health information in
treatment, reimbursement, health care operations, or administrative activities. 45
C.F.R. § 164.506 (2002). A "minimum necessary" standard on all disclosures by
health care providers existed in the Clinton rules, making mandatory only
disclosures to the individual and HHS for purposes of enforcement; HHS does
preserve this standard. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(b), 164.514(d). See also supra HHS
Fact Sheet.
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HHS also proposed an amendment to the definition of
"protected health information."250  It explicitly excluded
"employment records," referred to in the preamble as "individually
identifiable health information ... held by a covered entity in its
role as employer."251 According to the Health Privacy Project
[t]he plain language of the proposed text appears to move
outside of the Privacy Rule any use or disclosure of employee's
health plan records, as well as information shared with an
employer's on-site clinic where that clinic is a covered provider
under the current Privacy Rule. This is especially dangerous
because of the legitimate concern people have that employers
will use protected health information, including genetic
information, inappropriately to make employment-related
decisions (such as deciding which employees to promote or
fire).252
Further, the proposed HHS changes did not appear limited to
covered entities but potentially included all employers.253 The
Health Privacy Project observed that "[t]he exclusion for
'employment records' could be interpreted to apply to the health
information created or received through employer-sponsored
health plans, thus moving the health plan claims of every working
American (and their dependents) outside the scope of the Privacy
Rule." 254 This was a troubling development from the perspective of
HIV-positive employees, a group already vulnerable to
discrimination on the basis of privacy breaches. Further, the HHS
amendment potentially conflicted with the ADA protections for
medical information, specifically the requirement that medical
records be kept separate from employment files. 255
On August 9, 2002, HHS issued the new rules and
amendments created through its expanded comment period. 256
250. 67 C.F.R. § 14804 (2002).
251. Id.
252. Comments, supra note 249, at 37.
253. Id. at 38.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 39.
The proposed term "employment records" is not only dangerously broad,
but it is confusing given the backdrop of federal employment laws. The
Americans with Disabilities Act (as well as other federal laws) requires
that medical information obtained by an employer be collected in separate
forms and kept in confidential medical files, separate from personnel or
other employment-related records. These laws distinguish between
medical information and other types of employment records compiled by
employers. Thus, it is especially confusing for the Department to propose
the use of the term "employment records" as a way of referring to certain
medical records compiled by employers.
Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B).
256. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Issues First Major
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The new federal regulations go into effect on April 14, 2003, and
covered entities must be in compliance by that date with the
exception of small health plans, which have until April 14, 2004.257
The regulations, as expected, eliminate the patient consent
requirement and allow records to be accessed for marketing
purposes under certain conditions. 258 Employee health records are
not covered under HIPAA's protected information rule. 259
HIPAA sets a minimum standard for privacy protections, but
it does not preempt or override stronger state law.260 Minnesota's
medical records privacy laws261 should build upon HIPAA262 in
order to provide the best possible privacy protections, especially in
the employment context where HIPAA offers no assistance to
employees. 263  The Minnesota State Legislature should take
advantage of the lack of preemption in this area of the federal
regulations and promulgate laws creating higher standards for
Protections for Patient Privacy, HHS NEws (Aug. 9, 2002), at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2002pres/20020809a.html.
257. Id.
258. Press Release, Health Privacy Project, HHS Releases Final Modifications to
Privacy Regulation, Aug. 9, 2002, available at
http://www.healthprivacy.org/usr-doc/press-release802.pdf [hereinafter Health
Privacy Project Press Release]. HHS will now "merely require that providers ask
patients to acknowledge receipt of a privacy notice. Notice alone does not provide a
comparable opportunity for dialogue or understanding." Id. Marketing is narrowly
defined in the new regulations, and therefore many companies and manufacturers
will be able to circumvent the requirements and obtain patient information to send
targeted mailings about new drugs or the like. Id. Marketing is defined as "a
communication about a product or service that encourages the recipient to
purchase or use the product or service." 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.501, 164.508(a)(3) (2002).
Pharmacies do not have any opportunity to obtain prior consent from a patient
about the use of their health information for commercial purposes. Health Privacy
Project Press Release, supra, at 2. Pharmacies do not have to inform patients that
a drug company will be sending them letters. Id. These regulations seem to
contradict recent court actions upholding patient privacy, including a recent
settlement agreement in which a chain drug store, Eckerd's, used signatures from
customers when they picked up their prescriptions as "authorization" to release
their information for marketing purposes. Id. After the Florida Attorney General
began an investigation, Eckerd's agreed to change its policy and give customers the
chance to "opt-in" to the use of their information for marketing. Linda Kleindienst,
Eckerd Settles Customer Privacy Case, PHARMACY FORUM (July 11, 2002), at
http://www.pharmacyforum.com/eckerd-settlescustomer.privacy.htm.
259. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102-.103, 164.500.
260. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.203-.205. The Regulations allow more protective state laws
to contradict federal law. Id. According to the Health Privacy Project, "a state law
is more stringent when it prohibits or restricts a use or disclosure that would be
permitted under the regulation." Health Privacy Project, Summary of HIPAA
Privacy Rule, 34, Sept. 13, 2002, available at
http://www.healthprivacy.org/usr-doc/RegSummary2002.pdf.
261. MINN. STAT. § 144.335 (2002).




confidentiality of patient and employee health information. The
Legislature should also address the recent approval of the
Minnesota Health Department database designed to collect
patient names, addresses, and medical conditions from health
departments and insurers for service quality and cost analysis. 264
The legislature should pass laws to protect patient information
from unauthorized uses.
During the 2002 legislative session, MIAP introduced a
medical records privacy bill to provide better confidentiality
protections and stronger civil penalties in the state of
Minnesota. 265  The measure was MAP's response to several
compelling cases in the Project's legal program. 266 For example, a
health insurer sent an employer information on health care costs
for the group, which included the specific names of the
prescription drugs the employees were using. While the report did
not give individual names of employees, the information was
grouped in such a way that it was easy for the small business to
know who in the company was using which drugs. Because an
employee with HIV disease who is taking medication generally
requires a large quantity of different drugs that are recognizable
in their purpose, such information could easily "out" an employee
who has not disclosed his or her health status to an employer. In
another case, an HIV-positive construction worker told his boss
264. See Maura Lerner, Judge Ok's State Health Database, STAR-TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Dec. 3, 2002, at Al. The Health Department (MDH) claimed that it
needed the information to research health care quality and costs, and promised to
encrypt all information using several layers of codes. Id. Critics, including the
Minnesota Civil Liberties Union (MCLU) and the Citizen's Council on Health Care
(CCHC), objected, stating that MDH did not establish specific public health goals or
minimize the privacy impact on individuals as required under Minnesota Statute
section 62J. See Press Release, Minn. Civil Liberties Union, MCLU Weighs In on
Intrusive Medical Records Reporting Rules, Oct. 25, 2002 (on file with Law and
Inequality). The MCLU added that the rule could "have adverse public health
effects by deterring patients from seeking treatment for sensitive medical issues
out of privacy concerns." Id. CCHC noted that there were over 1,000 comments in
opposition to the rule, and that "only a few commentators, mostly health officials
and public health researchers, have expressed support for the rule without
reservation." CCHC, Public Response to Minnesota's Proposed Rule, 26, 27, Nov.
2002, available at http://www.cchconline.org/pdf/data-rules.pdf. A bill has been
introduced in the Minnesota House of Representatives that would require patient
consent before health care data could be shared with MDH. H.F. 164, 83rd Leg.
(Minn. 2003-2004).
265. The legislature placed the proposed bill on hold until the 2003 session for
further development and research. The discussion here centers on actions proposed
by the bill as it currently stands that are likely to be revisited during the 2003
legislative session. The Senate version is S.F. 3074 (Minn. 2001-02) and the House
version is H.F. 3601 (Minn. 2001-02).
266. See supra note 220.
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about his health status because of the potential adverse effects of
his medications. The next day he learned that his boss told all of
his coworkers. The resulting stigmatizing behaviors of his co-
workers forced him to quit his job. Finally, two employees, one
with HIV disease, the other with cancer, were terminated not, they
believe, because of job performance but rather due to escalating
health care premiums. Neither employee had ever released health
information to the employer.
These cases, and many others affecting individuals with HIV
disease and other stigmatizing diseases or high-cost conditions,
prove that the medical records privacy laws should be
strengthened through new legislation. Currently, insurers and
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) may release
confidential health information to employers for billing
purposes. 267  Current law does not prohibit disclosure of an
individual's confidential health information when employers,
HMOs, drug companies, or corporations hold medical records.
268
Further, penalties are extremely limited if an employer or provider
releases health information with the patient's permission. 269 It is
unclear whether the current statute covers health information
that an employee discloses verbally with an employer.
270
HMOs and other insurers should not be able to release
confidential health information to employers. While it is
understandable that a purchaser of health care - the employer -
would want data on how much it is spending on health care costs,
this data should not, in any way, personally identify an employee.
At a time when health care costs continue to escalate, an
employer's knowledge of an employee's health care costs could
adversely affect personnel decisions.
Employers, pharmaceutical companies, and health plans that
hold medical records should not be able to disclose the information
without patient consent. Currently, Minnesota's medical records
laws apply only to providers such as pharmacists, doctors, and
nurses. 271 Minnesota law, under this limited application, does not
cover an employer, a health plan, or a corporation that owns a
pharmacy that has access to medical records. 272 Thus, the law
does not prohibit entities from disclosing a patient's personal
267. MINN. STAT. § 62D.145, subd. 2(a)(6) (2002).
268. MINN. STAT. § 144.335, subd. 3(a) (2002).
269. MINN. STAT. § 144.335, subd. 6.
270. See id.




health information for marketing and fundraising purposes.
Current law does not define what constitutes a medical
record outside of the context of the medical provider system. This
lack of definition creates problems when medical information is
brought into the workplace, especially when the information is not
in the form of a medical record. Often information is shared
verbally between employer and employee. The bill proposed by
MAP provides a definition for health and medical information:
"information of a medical nature about a continuing medical
condition that is provided by the subject of the information and
that relates to a request for, or the potential need for, medical
leave or a reasonable or necessary accommodation." 27 3  The
definition provides a necessary framework and is inclusive of
verbal communications, thereby eliminating any doubt about
confidentiality breaches. The employer's only obligation under the
proposed bill is to inform the employee that medical information
could be protected at the employee's request;274 the employee still
has to take affirmative action to request that the information
remain confidential. 275
Finally, the medical records privacy bill outlines stronger
civil penalties for breaches of confidentiality. 276  Stricter
enforcement mechanisms can deter improper disclosure from
happening in the first place. The proposed law makes those who
negligently or intentionally release a health record or medical
information without consent liable for general damages and
compensatory damages for harm caused by the unauthorized
release, plus costs and reasonable attorneys fees. 277  General
damages based on unwarranted release would be easier to
demonstrate than the current standard of having to prove harm,
reinforcing the deterrent aspects of the law and placing less of a
burden to litigation on the employee.
Today, people with HIV are living longer. As a result,
issues of privacy and confidentiality are becoming increasingly
important, especially in the workplace where employers and
273. S.F. 3074, 2nd Eng., 82nd Leg. (Minn. 2001-02). The definition was
narrowly tailored through the use of the terms "continuing medical condition,"
"medical leave" and "reasonable or necessary accommodation" so as to avoid
situations such as the common cold or flu.
274. See id. at subd. 3.
275. See id.
276. See id. at § 1, subd. 4: "An employer who negligently or intentionally violates
Subd. 2 [employee consent to disclosure] is liable to the employee for damages, plus
costs and reasonable attorney fees." Id.
277. See H.F. 3601, 82nd Leg. (Minn. 2001-02).
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employees alike may be unaware of their obligations and rights
regarding health care information. The Bush Administration's
changes to HIPAA set an ominous precedent for employee privacy
protection. Minnesota should take this opportunity to strengthen
its laws and make a commitment to privacy worthy of the
precedents it set with regard to human rights and government
data privacy protections.
Conclusion
HIV is a complicated disease, varied in form, unpredictable in
result, and still incurable. Many individuals diagnosed early in
the epidemic continue to thrive, enjoying relatively normal lives,
while others endure painful infections, frequent hospitalizations,
and short life spans. The capricious nature of the disease
contributes to the general misunderstanding that surrounds it.
The unknown tends to breed fear, and fear, in turn, breeds stigma.
History shows us, repeatedly, that human nature tends to favor
self-preservation, no matter how irrational, before compassion.
This Article discusses the many changes in discrimination
and privacy laws that have occurred in recent years. These laws
seem to grow more complicated with the passage of time as courts,
policymakers, and advocates attempt to fit unique situations into
general legal frameworks. Such complications, however, are
necessary. So long as HIV remains a flashpoint for discrimination,
the laws must provide broad protections that take into account all
of the medical and social complexities associated with the disease.
However, if the Supreme Court further narrows the ADA's
application, and privacy laws fail to deter invasion, the legal
system will inadequately serve HIV-positive individuals.
Now that we are more than twenty years into the epidemic, it
is time to realize a new chapter in the fight for the rights of HIV-
positive individuals. We celebrate the victories of longer lives and
progress made. The third decade represents an opportunity for
focusing the law in an attempt to eradicate, once and for all, the
stigma, hate, and fear individuals with HIV disease do not deserve
and should not have to endure.
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